The plastics treaty process is moving again, but the division that brought negotiations to a halt in Geneva remains unresolved: should the treaty establish binding common measures, or rely predominantly on nationally determined action?
In August 2026, the new Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee circulated an Aid to Negotiations. The document has returned attention to the INC and provided a structure for renewed consultations. It has not, however, resolved the fundamental disagreements over the treaty’s scope, obligations and decision-making architecture.
A treaty of the willing: Consensus, critical mass and pathways to an effective plastics treaty argues that the consensus culture surrounding the negotiations gives disproportionate influence to governments prepared to accept failure. These states need only maintain their opposition, while those seeking stronger rules are expected to make the concessions required to preserve consensus. The likely result is continued deadlock or an agreement weakened until it can no longer deliver the coordinated change needed to end plastic pollution.
The paper challenges the assumption that effectiveness requires universal participation. International treaties routinely enter into force and operate without every eligible state joining. The more relevant question is whether participating governments collectively possess the market reach, regulatory capacity, political support and implementation resources needed to make particular measures work.
The paper’s demand-side analysis uses municipal plastic-waste generation as an indicative proxy for relative end-use demand. The resulting estimates suggest that a geographically broad coalition of ambitious states from Europe, Latin America, Africa and South-East Asia could represent a substantial share of estimated global end-use demand. Acting together, these states could establish common requirements across a sufficiently broad set of markets to influence how plastic products are designed, used and managed, with effects extending beyond the countries formally participating in an agreement.
The level of critical mass required will depend on the measure at issue. Common product requirements and design standards can become effective when adopted across a sufficiently important set of consumer markets, giving producers an incentive to apply the same standards more broadly. Measures that directly restrict primary plastic production face greater risks of relocation and free riding and may require broader participation or additional safeguards. The relevant threshold is therefore not a fixed percentage of global demand, but the level of participation needed to make each measure effective.
The paper considers three possible pathways: developing and advancing a coherent proposal within the INC; establishing an independent negotiating process among willing states; or pursuing particular agreements through other international institutions. These pathways are not mutually exclusive. Each depends on the same prior work: building a capable coalition, identifying effective measures and developing treaty text that participating governments are genuinely prepared to support.
The central message is straightforward. Governments seeking an effective treaty should not wait for another breakdown before organising themselves. The forum should serve the strategy, rather than determine its limits.
The paper was written by Torbjørn Graff Hugo. The views expressed are the sole responsibility of the author.